




DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAMI-AM

8 SEP 1981

SUBJECT: Recommendations for Employment of SECOM Funds Allocated to
CSS

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Chairman,
Computer Security Subcommittee
SECOM, NFIB

1. The purpose of this letter is to comply with your request for a list of recommended projects to be funded by the Computer Security Subcommittee (CSS). It is our firm belief that CSS funds should be allocated only to those projects which will produce an identifiable, tangible product which will have broad Intelligence Community use. Further, applications supported by DIA and the military services should have universal value in military intelligence functions.

2. The most critical requirement facing the entire Intelligence Community (IC) today is the need to Redefine and Restructure the Security and Protection Attributes Which Support the Automated Handling and Communication of Intelligence Information. The multitude of classifications, codewords, caveats, control and dissemination restrictions present in the IC today have introduced great complexity into the processing and transmission of vital intelligence. The proliferation of intelligence systems and current planning for their future interface demands careful, judicious study of this problem and development of a workable, practical, hierarchic structure of standard security and protection attributes which can be implemented in the automated information handling world. I am currently working on the first draft of a much more detailed paper on this subject and will provide it to you when completed. In the meantime, I feel very strongly that the subcommittee should identify and support this project. Because there is already some interest in solution of this problem in the Data Standards Panel of the Intelligence Information Handling Committee, NFIB, it could be made a joint project with that group.

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→ 3. Next in priority is the need for a broad, definitive study of The Threats Against Intelligence Automation. Such a study might well be an outgrowth of the compilation activity which DIA RSE-4 now has underway

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
with the Military Intelligence Reserve unit in Texas. If content dictates, this product should be produced in two versions; one hopefully at the SECRET collateral level for broad, general dissemination, and a second at the TOP SECRET SCI level for more restricted IC dissemination. Command- and management-level attention and interest must be gained and maintained through provision of well-written expositions on the serious threats against automated systems.

4. As an ancillary to The Threats Against Intelligence Automation there should be produced, as a separate document if necessary, a serious, lay-man language Compromising Emanation Threat Study. Decision-authorities in Army and the other services are confronted on a daily basis with the requirement to approve or disapprove the design of automated systems at both the tactical and strategic levels which must incorporate protection against compromising emanations. The credibility of this EMSEC requirement is not now well established, except in the electronic engineer-oriented language of NACSEM 5100. There is a demand for a definitive, detailed, explanatory threat and countermeasure document which can be read, understood and applied by managerial personnel without the need for engineer interpretation. Production of this study should be a joint effort with the Subcommittee on Compromising Emanations (SCOCE).

5. There is also a strong requirement for an authoritative Automation Security Dictionary defining all the terms and criteria to be applied in clear, precise language. A precedent exists in United States Communications Security Board (USCSB 2-17) "Glossary of Communications Security and Emanations Security Terms," October 1974.

6. Lastly, a requirement exists for the development and promulgation of an IC guidance document on the application of Risk Analysis Criteria, Procedures, and Techniques for Automation and Communication Systems in the Intelligence Community.

7. I will be happy to elaborate on any of the above recommendations at your request.



J. E. STUDER
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